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Cake day: June 6th, 2023

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  • The bootloader of your phone (if locked) is one of the most secure parts. It’s very hard to get into a modern phones bootloader. In contrast, finding an exploit in a running phone is a lot more feasible.

    If a vulnerability was abused to get into your running phone, it will persist until the phone reboots, and the bootloader verifies the core parts of the operating system at startup. In order to persist past a reboot, malware like that would need a vulnerability in the bootloader, or a bypass for its integrity checks.

    Alongside that, any background services (“daemons”) that got stuck or became slow over time are forced to restart. Operating system updates can be applied, and working memory is cleared.

    In general, it’s just good advice to just reboot your phone once in a while. There’s no harm in doing so.














  • Most “standard” messaging apps (that includes signal, telegram) use the “OS provided” push service. On Android, they use firebase cloud messaging, a component of google play services.

    Degoogled Android means not having any notifications, unless the app supports UnifiedPush, runs in the background 24/7 (which drains battery), or runs in the background occasionally (which delays notifications).

    If the app runs in the background occasionaly, you can “burden” the people on the other side by being slow to respond.


  • Most malware is written for Windows, especially when it’s distributed as a Windows executable. (Almost) no Windows malware targets Wine specifically. However, Wine on its own is not a sandboxing tool, and Windows ransomware will ruin your day.

    Bottles does two things for security:

    1. Separate wineprefixes
    2. Being a flatpak

    By separating wineprefixes, as long as the host filesystem is not directly exposed (which iirc is default for bottles), any malware not written with Wine in mind will only affect its own “bottle”.

    By being a flatpak, even if some Windows malware specifically targets Wine, it would still have to escape the flatpak sandbox for elevated permissions. If the bottles flatpak has no access to personal files, “Wine-aware” malware won’t either.

    Although malware can still do damage, even in its own sandbox. For example, botnet type malware would still function. The host system is “safe”, but the damage can still be done externally. Usually application-defined “autostarting” of applications is broken under Wine (iirc), which means all non “Wine-aware” malware will only start when an infected windows application is started in bottles.

    Any sandbox will eventually be escaped, and malware sophisticated enough will be able to get access to everything on the host system. The chances of running into malware like this in the wild are extremely small.

    • Is it fully secure? No.
    • Is your virtual Windows environment safe? No.
    • Are other “bottles” safe? Likely, as long as the malware isn’t aware of Wine.
    • Is your Linux host safe? Most likely, depending on your flatpak settings. (and the malware has to specifically target Wine under Flatpak).